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Introduction
1 Rio de Janeiro has a storied record of supporting environmental action. The city twice
hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: in 1992 when it
was more widely known as the “Earth Summit” and in 2012, when it was called “Rio+20.”
During  this  time  period,  the  International  Olympic  Committee  (IOC)  amplified  its
rhetorical commitment to environmental sustainability, although host-city follow-though
was routinely lacking. This historical backdrop raised the question: could the Rio 2016
Olympics  sync ambitious  rhetoric  with ecological  progress?  The answer  has  been an
emphatic “no.” For various reasons, Olympic organizers and city officials have failed to
achieve every major environmental legacy they promised ahead of the 2016 Games, which
take place from August 5 to 21.
2 In the twenty-first century, Olympic hosts are expected to proclaim a lofty list of “legacy”
projects  that  will  remain  after  the  Games,  programs  and  infrastructure  that  will
purportedly  benefit  the  host  city  years  into  the  future.  In  the  modern  era,  several
Olympic “legacy” projects gleam green. The Rio 2016 Games exemplify this trend. To
marshal public support, organizers declared more than twenty-five legacies: about half
either  directly  addressed  environmental  issues  (e.g.  remediation  of  Guanabara  Bay’s
notorious waters) or indirectly signaled environmental benefits (e.g. building up public
transport networks like the Bus Rapid Transit [BRT] system) (Santos Junior et al 2015). 
3 The  original  Rio  2016  candidature,  submitted  to  the  IOC  in  2009,  emphasized
environmental commitment. The Olympic bid pledged, “The 2016 Games will accelerate
several important environmental projects bringing direct benefits to local communities
including  regeneration  of  urban  areas,  air  quality  improvement  and  reduced
consumption of non-renewable natural resources” (Rio 2016, 2009, Vol. 1, 37). Bidders
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advanced a “‘Green Games for a Blue Planet’ vision for the Rio Games” (95) that combined
the resources of federal,  state, and local governments. In this article we examine the
evidence and find that these promises, in general, have not been met. 
 
A panoramic view
4 To  many  cariocas these  bold  environmental  promises  had  a  haunting  ring.  In  the
competition to stage the 2007 Pan-American Games, bidders vowed water cleanup and
upgraded housing, but after hosting the Pan-Ams, the waterways stayed polluted and, it
turns  out,  the  athlete  village  was  built  on  environmentally  delicate  peat  land (Curi,
Knijnik, and Mascarenhas 2011). Environmental assurances remained unfulfilled.
5 Rio’s Olympic bid promised to finally follow through and clean up Guanabara Bay, which
will host the sailing competition, and of the Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, which will be home
to rowing, canoeing, and kayaking. And bidders declared that two sanitation programs—
at Barra-Jacarepaguá in western Rio and at Guanabara Bay in the east—would “result in
more than 80% of overall sewage collected and treated by 2016” (Rio 2016, 2009, Vol. 1,
97). However, as the Games neared, it became clear that these ambitious projects were
not on pace. In April 2015 around forty tons of dead fish mysteriously appeared at Lagoa
Rodrigo de Freitas. This followed two months after a similar calamity in Guanabara Bay
where another massive fish die-off occurred (Wade 2015). Rio Governor Luiz Fernando
Pezão  stunned  many  when  he  publicly  pushed  back  the  estimated  finish  date  for
Guanabara Bay’s cleanup from 2016 to 2035 (Barchfield 2015).
6 Given the inability to solve the environmental woes of Guanabara Bay, some suggested
transferring the sailing competition to Buzios, approximately 150 kilometers from Rio. A
number of Olympic committees, including from the US, supported the move, but they
were rebuffed by Games organizers (Dolzan 2015). In light of the ever-changing dynamics,
the World Sailing Federation forged a Flexibility Plan to reduce the risks for athletes
(Estado de São Paulo, 2016).
7 Olympic organizers also broke their promises related to tree planting. To offset carbon
emissions, Rio 2016 pledged to plant 24 million trees by 2016 (Rio 2016, 2009, Vol. 1, 33).
Carlos Minc, the State of Rio de Janeiro’s Secretary for the Environment, escalated the
promise to 34 million trees  (Konchinski  2015).  However,  the “Rio 2016 Sustainability
Report” issued in 2014 conspicuously made no mention of the tree-planting initiative.
Instead, Rio organizers heralded the launch of its “Embrace Sustainability” program, with
Dow—the “official chemistry company of the Olympic Games”—the program’s inaugural
member (Rio 2016 Organizing Committee 2014). By Spring 2015, environmental officials
admitted that only 5.5 million trees had been planted and that Rio 2016 was on track to
plant only around 8 million trees before the Games commenced, merely a third of the 24
million enumerated in the bid and less than a quarter of Minc’s promise (Konchinski
2015). 
8 The Olympic golf course also raised environmental questions. Golf was returning to the
Olympics after a 112-year hiatus. This development was widely welcomed by Rio 2016
project managers, which was no surprise, considering that the city has been governed by
urban  entrepreneurialism  for  the  past  two  decades  (Harvey  2011;  Vainer  2000;
Mascarenhas 2011). This urban management model is notable for its ‘market-friendly’
attitudes  and  for  public  policies—like  public-private  partnerships—that  aggressively
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attract and enable private investment. The construction of Rio’s Olympic golf course is a
classic  example  of  such  public-private  partnerships,  configured  alongside  real-estate
interests and tailored to meet their needs. The sport of golf implies a particular social
status that chimes with these class interests. Conveniently, golf also demands significant
chunks of quiet green space; this, in turn, enhances real-estate values (Bale 1993).
9 Building a  new golf  course for  the Olympics  was  optional.  Rio already has  two elite
courses—Gávea Golf Club and Itanhangá Golf Club—that have staged major tournaments.
In fact, Rio Olympic bidders touted this history (Rio 2016, 2009, Vol. 2, 165). One could
fathom renovating one of  the  existing courses  to  meet  Olympic  standards.  But  Rio’s
Olympic Delivery Authority claimed Gávea Golf  Club lacked the space to expand and
Itanhangá Golf Club did not have necessary drainage and irrigation.  Olympic officials
argued that fixing up Itanhangá would have been just as costly as building a brand new
course (Autoridade Pública Olímpica 2015).
10 Olympic organizers were fortunate to have numerous potential locations to choose from
for the new golf  course,  including inside the Deodoro Olympic area situated inside a
working-class suburb of Rio. But the new course was instead built in Barra da Tijuca, a
wealthy western suburb that doubles as a high-end real-estate zone. The goal was clear:
to maximize profits. To pull this off, Rio Mayor Rio Eduardo Paes hatched an audacious
political  maneuver  made easier  by  the  Olympic  state  of  exception.  In  an emergency
session just before Christmas 2012, Paes shepherded to passage a seemingly innocuous
“Complementary  Law  125”  that  was  full  of  dubious  maneuvers  including  the
circumvention of  environmental  impact  reports  and the sidestepping of  cumbersome
public hearings. Beyond this,  Mayor Paes orchestrated a massive real-estate deal that
looked like a pretext for land speculation: private developers covered the cost of the golf
course’s construction in exchange for the right to build 140 luxury apartments around
the course and garner all the profits from their sale (Hodges 2014).
11 The  golf  course’s  location  was  also  controversial.  Again,  environmental  issues  were
downplayed. The course overlapped Marapendi Nature Reserve, an ecologically sensitive
area protected by law since 1959 that  was home to numerous threatened species.  In
building the course, vegetation and natural habitat was decimated. This sparked intense
resistance from activist groups like “Golfe Para Quem?” (“Golf For Whom?”) and “Ocupa
Golfe”  (“Occupy  Golf”).  The  groups  brought  together  biologists  and  environmental
lawyers to rally alongside street activists to try to halt the construction. The government
heavily repressed the movement and the project proceeded apace. The entire episode
clanged dissonantly against Rio 2016’s proclaimed environmental ethos and the specific
ecological promises it laid out in its Olympic bid (Boykoff 2016).
12 To be sure, the Olympics have jumpstarted some positive environmental developments.
The extension of the Metro—known as Linha 4—will ease travel between the notorious
stretch of snarled traffic between the tourist-friendly Zona Sul and the Olympic epicenter
in Barra da Tijuca. Although construction is woefully behind schedule, after the Games,
Linha 4 will remain in place for cariocas to use—part of a “sustainable transport legacy”
(Rio 2016, 2009, Vol. 3, p. 97). The introduction of VLT transport system (tramway), with
electric low-noise vehicles is  also positive.  Yet,  a  road-oriented,  high-polluting urban
policy,  remains in place,  including through the BRT system, the city’s  main mobility
project.
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Conclusion
13 The 2016 Rio Olympics bring into sharp focus the gap between environmental word and
deed. While the UN’s recent environmental plan (2015, 10)—“Transforming Our World:
the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development”—asserts  that  “Sport  is…an important
enabler of sustainable development,” we have seen that the IOC—a close UN ally—has
allowed sport  to  enable  greenwashing.  In  Rio,  green branding has  trumped material
environmental change. Neither Guanabara Bay, nor the local lakes and rivers have been
decontaminated to the degree promised. By March 2015, the Brazilian press reported that
none of  the major  environmental  projects  related to  the Olympics  would be finished
before the Games began (Konchinski 2016). 
14 An  academic  consensus  has  emerged  that  in  practice,  sports  mega-events  like  the
Olympic Games are not sustainability enhancers, despite the rhetoric emerging from the
IOC  and  local  organizing  committees.  Hosting  the  Olympics  does  not  automatically
translate into positive environmental legacies after the event. As John Karamichas (2013,
203)  asserts,  “no  causality  was  identified  between  Olympic  Games  hosting  and
improvements  in  the  EM  [ecological  modernization]  capacity  of  the  host  nation.”
Environmental accountability is seriously lacking. Even in a place like Rio, with its rich
history of environmental concern, a gaping chasm exists between green rhetoric and
reality.
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